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TheTranslation of Republic 606a3–b5
and Plato’s Partite Psychology*
Damien Storey
In this paper I discuss a line in Plato’s description of his ‘greatest ac-
cusation’ against imitative poetry: that it corrupts even ‘decent people’
(τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς). Decent people are those who have largely true eth-
ical beliefs and largely abide by them in their behaviour, but who also,
because they have been ‘insufficiently educated in reason and habit’
(606a7–8), fall short of being truly virtuous, in two respects: they only
have true ethical beliefs, not ethical knowledge, and at times they can
only abide by their beliefs by restraining unruly passions.The line I am
going to discuss, 606a3–b5, explains how imitative poetry strengthens
these unruly passions until they can no longer be restrained.
This line is central to Plato’s account of how poetry corrupts its audi-
ence and is one of the Republic’s most complex and interesting applica-
tions of his partite psychology, but, unfortunately, it is also not an easy
line to understand: it introduces, at least implicitly, a partite analysis of
a reflexive attitude—a thought a person has about themselves—that is
not only difficult in itself, but further obscured by an ambiguity in the
relevant reflexive pronoun, ἑαυτῷ: either ‘itself ’ or ‘himself ’. This is a
small word, but one on which the meaning of the sentence pivots, as
does, consequently, our understanding of Plato’s accusation against im-
itative poetry.
* I am grateful to Amin Benaissa, Amy Garland, and Paul Reynold for discussion of
the passage and/or comments on a draft of this paper.
The majority of translations, including the most widely used, side
with ‘itself ’, and this choice is explicitly defended in the only substan-
tial discussion of 606a3–b5’s translation.¹ I believe there are considera-
tions that show decisively that this is the wrong choice. Some are basic
considerations of consistency and sense, and others call for amore gen-
eral discussion of Plato’s partite psychology: if we are to understand
the kind of complex interaction between psychological subjects that
we find in 606a3–b5, especially in the difficult cases of reflexive atti-
tudes, we need to reflect carefully about how the parts of the soul are
related to the whole person in Plato’s psychology.
I
The text andmy translation of 606a3–b8 is as follows, with some of its
multiple psychological subjects highlighted:
S1 A non-rational part of the soul
S2 The rational part of the soul
S3 The whole person
Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον [S1] τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις606a3
συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι
ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπι-a5
θυμεῖν, τότ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον
καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν [S2], ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς
πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ
θρηνώδους τούτου [S1], ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ [S3 or S2]b1
οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὂν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαί-
ρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν
ἡγεῖται [S3], τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι
καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος.b5
[You will understand why it is unreasonable] if you reflect that the part
restrained by force [S1] in our own misfortune, and that hungered for the
satisfaction of weeping and lamenting, because it desires these things by
1 Mastrangelo and Harris, 1997
[ 2 ]
nature, is also the part that derives satisfaction and enjoyment from the
poets. But the best part of our nature [S2], since it has not been sufficiently
educated by either reason or habit, relaxes its guard over this sorrowful
part [S1], since it is watching another’s sufferings and <one thinks>² it is
no shame to oneself [S3] to approve of and pity another man who, while
claiming to be good, grieves disproportionately, but rather one [S3] thinks
that this is a gain—pleasure; and one would not choose to be deprived of
this by despising the whole poem.
The disagreement concerns the subject of the sentence from a7–b5,
and in particular whether and/or where it changes. The ἑαυτῷ at b1
could be either neuter or masculine: either ‘to itself ’ (S2) or ‘to one-
self/himself ’ (S3). As I do, a significant minority of translators take it
to be masculine, which entails that the person as a whole its masculine
antecedent.³Thus, if it is masculine, ἑαυτῷ signals a shift from the sen-
tence’s opening neuter subject—τὸ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν (S2)—to the
whole person (S3).⁴ In contrast, the majority of translations assume
that the subject is the rational part throughout the sentence.⁵Now, this
is at least partly mistaken: καταφρονήσας (‘despising’) near the end of
the sentence ismasculine, so at somepoint the sentencemust have shif-
ted from the rational part to the whole person—the question is where
rather than whether this change occurs.
2 I take this to be implicit; otherwise, Socrates asserts that it is no shame to pity in-
appropriate grieving, though he believes the opposite: 605e4–7. Some translators
tackle this by taking the second ἅτε to introduce a non-assertive context: e.g. Hal-
liwell, ‘on the grounds that’, 1988; or Cornford, ‘with the excuse that’, 1941. That
might be right, though it jars with the first ἅτε, which is assertive.
3 For example, Jowett–Campbell, 1894, 456; Cornford, 1941; and Halliwell, 1988.
Adam comments, quoting Jowett–Campbell: ‘“Plato passes from the rational part
of soul to the man himself ” J. and C. Hence καταφρονήσας below. The antithesis
with ἄλλος ἀνήρ makes the meaning clear,’ 1902.
4 That is, a shift of reference within the impersonal, accusative absolute construction
introduced by αἰσχρὸν ὂν, preparing the reader for the masculine subject of ἡγεῖται
and δέξαιτο.
5 For example, Shorey, 1978;Bloom, 1968; andGrube andReeve, 1992.This continues
in some of the most recent translations, such as Reeve, 2004, and Sachs, 2006.
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This gives us the right question, but it does little to settle the dis-
agreement. In a thorough discussion of this line, Mastrangelo andHar-
ris agree that the subject changes, but deny that the change is anticip-
ated by a masculine ἑαυτῷ.⁶They argue that the antecedent of ἑαυτῷ is
simply the nearest andmost explicit candidate, the neuter τὸ βέλτιστον,
and that ἀλλά at b3 introduces an independent clause in which the sub-
ject changes to the whole person.⁷ With just the grammar of the sen-
tence in view, it is fair to say that the burden of proof is on anyone who
claims that the change is earlier andmore abrupt.What I aim todonow
is show that this burden of proof can bemet comfortably: first, with an
examination of the text (II) and, second, with reflections on Platonic
psychology (III).
I I
If the rational part is the antecedent of ἑαυτῷ, then it is also the part
with which we ‘pity’ (ἐλεεῖν) another man. But consider the immedi-
ately subsequent line:
For few, I think, are among those who can reason to the conclusion that
the pleasure we take from another’s suffering necessarily transfers to our
own: for once the pitying part is nursed to strength in another’s suffering,
it is not easy to restrain it in our own suffering. (606b5–8; my emphasis)
In this line we hear about a part that is both (a) ‘the pitying part’⁸ and
(b) the part that is normally restrained in our own suffering. Concern-
6 Mastrangelo and Harris, 1997.
7 They insert a high dot before the ἀλλά to reflect their view that it is an independent
clause. Adapting from Shorey, they translate: ‘… relaxes its guard over the plaintive
part [S1], inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame
to it [S2] to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons
himself to excess in his grief; but he thinks [S3] this vicarious pleasure is so much
clear gain…’
8 Alternatively, τὸ ἐλεινόν might be translated simply ‘the pity’, though the result is
the same: if ‘the pity’ is restrained, so is the part that pities.
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ing (a), this pity is clearly the same as the pity at b3 of the previous
line—the argument depends on this. Concerning (b), the part that is
‘not easy to restrain in our own suffering’ is undoubtedly the same as
‘the part restrained by force in our ownmisfortune’ in the previous line.
Together, (a) and (b) entail that the part that feels pity at b3 is the non-
rational part with which the line opens, (S1). (And it seems entirely
fitting that the emotion of pity arises from the part that ‘hungers for
the satisfaction of weeping and lamenting’.) Consequently, the subject
to which it is no shame to pity cannot be (S2), the rational part that
restrains the pity; but it can be (S3), the whole person to whom the
pitying part belongs.
Consider next the function of the second ἅτε (since) clause: our ra-
tional part ‘relaxes its guard over the sorrowful part since …’, introdu-
cing an explanation. If there is no shift to thewhole person, then the ex-
planation the ‘since’ introduces is that it is not shameful for the rational
part to pity another’s grief (the thought being that one is not guilty of
another person’s crimes). But a moments reflection makes it clear that
this is a non sequitur.There is nodiscernible connection between the ra-
tional part’s reason for allowing itself to pity and the fact that it ‘relaxes
its guard over the sorrowful part’.
The clause makes perfect sense, however, if it is the whole person
for whom it is thought not to be shameful, since the person’s shameful
behaviour can now be understood to be motivated by the emotions
of their ‘sorrowful part’. The best part of our nature relaxes its guard
over our sorrowful part, allowing this non-rational part to freely pity
the grieving character—as it is wont to do when unguarded—since:
we think (i.e. our rational part thinks) it is not shameful for us to pity
(i.e. for our sorrowful part to pity) another’s suffering.
It is true that this introduces an abrupt shift from the rational part to
the whole person, but in comparison this is a minor difficulty, and it is
not as abrupt as it appears. As Adam points out, the change is signalled
by ‘anotherman’ (ἄλλος ἀνήρ; b2), which introduces a contrast with an
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implicit first man. That is, it is natural to take the thought to be that it
is no shame for one man to pity another man—not that it is no shame
for ‘the best part of our nature’ to pity another man, as if it were itself
a man. We might also think that the sentence’s opening subject—‘the
best part of our nature’—prepares us for the shift by reminding us that
the rational part it is speaking of is just a part of a person. This is an
unusual psychological subject: in a way both us (its thoughts are our
thoughts) and a part of us. In the rest of this paper, I examine the con-
nection between the sentence’s surprising psychological subject and its
surprising shift from a part to the whole of this subject.
I I I
For Plato, many of the psychological states that we attribute to a per-
son are, strictly speaking, psychological states of a part of this person.
To say that a person has an appetite for food is, on analysis, to say that
this person’s appetitive part has an appetite for food: a person has an
appetite for food by virtue of having an appetitive part that exercises
its capacity to form such appetites. Consequently, for many psycho-
logical states there are two permitted descriptions, a description that
takes the person as the subject—a ‘person-description’—and a more
psychologically exact description that takes a part of this person as the
subject—a ‘part-description’. Both descriptions are correct, but only a
part-description can tell us the particular way in which a person is the
subject of psychological states, especially complex ones. For example,
part-descriptions are necessary to explain cases of psychological con-
flict, as we saw in book 4.
A part-description always has a corresponding person-description
that describes the same psychological state of affairs. It cannot both
be true, for example, that the appetitive part of a person’s soul has an
appetite and be false that the person has this appetite. Just as my hand
cannot move unless I move, a part of me cannot have a psychological
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attitude unless I have this attitude.⁹ To assume otherwise would be to
think of a person as a fourth part alongside the other three parts, rather
than ‘the whole, which is the community of all three parts’ (442c7–8).
From these reflections, we can see hownatural it is tomove between
part-descriptions and person-descriptions. We might think that this is
especially true when moving between a person and their rational part,
since this is usually thought to be the part of the soul with which we
identify most closely.¹⁰ However, the main point I wish to make con-
cerns how this partite psychology applies to the kind of reflexive atti-
tudes we find in 606a3–b5.
Since we are capable of having attitudes towards ourselves, we can
expect some of our psychological parts to be capable of having atti-
tudes towards us. For example, since it is the spirited part ‘with which
we get angry’ (439e3–4), the person-description ‘he is angrywith him-
self ’ will be analysed as the part-description ‘his spirited part is angry
with him’. But while this part-description is strictly speaking correct, it
is verymisleading. It gives the impression that his spirited part is angry
with another person—or worse, that it is a little person inside of him
whom he has angered. The problem is that we expect (in Greek as in
English) the objects of reflexive attitudes like self-anger to be reflexive
pronouns, but ‘his spirited part is angry with himself ’ is ungrammat-
ical. Since ‘…angry with him’ is misleading and ‘…angry with himself ’
is ungrammatical, we are leftwith no satisfactory part-description.This
isn’t an error in Plato’s theory: a person analysed asmultiple subjects is
not something anticipated by normal language use, so inevitably some
9 Also like my hand and me, the entailment does not go both ways. Something can
be true of a personwithout also being true of any of their parts: that a person is, say,
just, akratic, or happy does not entail that any part of their soul is just, akratic, or
happy.Though it might not worry every interpreter, it is worth noticing that if it is
the rational part to which it is shameful in 606a3–b5, this suggests that something
can be shameful not only for a person, but also for their parts. That is, it suggests
that Plato offers a partite analysis not only of the subject of psychological states but
also of the object of moral evaluations.
10 As Plato recognises. See especially 588b–589e.
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linguistic anomalies will arise.¹¹What it shows is that when describing
reflexive attitudes, part-descriptions need to be avoided in favour of
the corresponding person-descriptions. Hence the change in 606a3–
b8: Plato wishes to describe a thought that our rational part has about
us, so as a matter of stylistic necessity he describes this using the relev-
ant person-description—a thought that we have about ourselves.¹²
Let’s turn now to the competing translation, according to which the
rational part thinks about itself, not about the person as a whole, so
that both the subject and object of the reflexive attitude is a part of the
soul. I have emphasised that the aim of Plato’s psychology is to explain
our everyday psychology: it offers unfamiliar explanations for familiar
psychological states. Part-descriptions are never introduced for their
own sake; each must have a sensible person-description to which it
corresponds—otherwise it explains nothing, and is psychologically in-
coherent to boot.This being so, we can already conclude that the parts
of our soul rarely have attitudes about themselves simply by noticing
that we rarely have attitudes about the parts of our soul. If you have
never thought to yourself that something is shameful for your rational
part, then ipso facto neither has your rational part.¹³
With this in mind, consider the proposed translation ‘it [sc. the ra-
tional part] thinks it is no shame to it to praise and pity …’ What is
the correspondingperson-description?Thedirect correspondent is ‘he
thinks it is no shame tohis rational part’, but a decentmanhardlywatch-
es a play thinking about the moral standing of his Platonic parts. In
theory, a viable alternative would be a person-description that refers
11 Compare Plato’s discussion of the absurdity of the phrase κρείττω αὑτοῦ: 430e11–
431b2.
12 Compare the change of subject at 440a8–b7, from person-description to part-
description, whenPlato is describing someone ‘reproaching himself ’ (λοιδοροῦντά
… αὑτὸν).
13 At least explicitly and de dicto. There will be occasions when not only the subject,
but also the object of our psychological states could be given a part-description:
e.g. if you believe you are clever, your rational part could be described as having,
unbeknownst to it (or you), a belief about its own state.
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indirectly to the rational part, so that the person is not thinking of it
explicitly. But what could this be?While such a description is possible
in principle, in this specific case there is no reasonable candidate. In
short: there appears to be no human thought that corresponds to ‘it
thinks it is no shame to it to praise and pity’, which is another way of
saying that it appears to be psychologically incoherent.
The mistranslation of 606a3–b5 illustrates how easy it is to fail to
appreciate that Plato divides the soul into parts only to better explain
the whole. In particular, it is easy to fall into the error of treating the
parts of the soul like little people, homunculi, with their own thoughts
and concerns, a tendency that is not helped byPlato’s frequent (though
purely literary) personification of the parts. But it is also an error easily
avoided if we keep a constant eye on how we are going to move from
part- to person-description. Simply appreciating that the rational part’s
thoughts just are the decent person’s thoughts is almost enough to re-
cognise that 606a3–b5makes psychological sense only if ἑαυτῷ is mas-
culine.This is not to say that themove frompart- to person-description
is always straightforward. As we saw, partite analyses even of some-
thing as common as reflexive attitudes are both difficult to interpret
and difficult for Plato to express. But tricky as they can be, it pays to
work on the assumption that Plato’s psychological analyses will ulti-
mately make good psychological sense.
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